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One sentiment about the government’s contemporary approach 
to corporate crime holds that prosecutors have been protective of 
their enormous, largely unreviewable charging discretion and have 
appeared to act imperiously and without a sufficient sense of 
accountability from one case to the next.1 This view is most commonly 
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 1. See, e.g., A Mammoth Guilt Trip, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21614101-corporate-america-finding-it-ever-harder-
stay-right-side-law-mammoth-guilt [https://perma.cc/AZD5-KJUV] (condemning the 
profiteering nature of the government’s prosecution of private companies, the clandestine 
nature of the settlements, and the manner in which the government inserts itself into these 
companies’ decision-making structure, all of which contribute to vagueness in the law on 
this matter); The Criminalisation of American Business, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614138-companies-must-be-punished-when-
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held among corporations and their counsel but has also been 
expressed, in more measured tones, by academic critics of the 
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) corporate prosecution program.2 
While hankering for legislative reform, critics have persistently called 
for more transparency and less secrecy in corporate prosecutions, 
often without exploring what that might entail.3 
It might be illuminating to flip this sort of claim on its head. 
Instead of asking, “Why do prosecutors act so arrogant and 
unaccountable?” one might ask, “Why do they say so much and why 
do they seem so insecure about their accountability?” In other words, 
if prosecutors hold all the cards when it comes to corporate 
prosecutions, why do they show so many of them? 
American prosecutors, it should be remembered, are not 
obligated to say anything about their cases unless and until they go to 
court to present those cases at a trial. Even then, there is no 
requirement for public explanation but simply the reality that they 
must say something, or at least call a witness, to satisfy their burden of 
proof. Indeed, standards of professional conduct differentiate 
prosecutors from other lawyers, including other criminal lawyers, by 
restricting their freedom to speak and warning against the particular 
danger that prosecutorial utterances can pose to fairness in the 
criminal process.4 The routine American prosecution process is filled 
 
they-do-wrong-legal-system-has-become-extortion [https://perma.cc/X6ZQ-F2PA] 
(criticizing the increasing prevalence of the government’s bringing criminal prosecutions 
against private companies and the secrecy behind the non-prosecution settlements of 
those cases). 
 2. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1326 (2013); Michael 
Patrick Wilt, Who Watches the Watchmen? Accountability in Federal Corporate Criminal 
Prosecution Agreements, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61, 65 (2015); see also Russell Mokhiber, 
Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements, CORP. 
CRIME REP. (Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7MFT-76V7].  
 3. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CAN JUSTICE BE ACHIEVED THROUGH 
SETTLEMENTS? 3 (2015), http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1917/12678/file
/2015_PolicyBrief1_Settlements_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF4X-N2JU]. But see Brandon 
L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 48–52 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research, Working Paper No. 2017-03, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2904035 [https://perma.cc/63YW-NAF5] (proposing various forms of 
judicial and legislative oversight). 
 4. See AM. BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION §	3-1.10 (4th ed. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice
/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition.html [https://perma.cc/U6G4-S8JM]; see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §	1-7.400 (2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-7000-media-relations#1-7.400 [https://perma.cc/R6GT-
6KP2]. 
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with secrecy, from grand jury proceedings to the opacity of charging 
decisions to the absence of public justification for plea bargains.5 
Defense lawyers are far less strictly regulated in what they can 
say outside court and are sometimes counseled, particularly in high-
profile cases, to aggressively “try the case in the press.”6 Meanwhile, 
criminal defense attorneys usually would prefer that prosecutors keep 
their mouths shut and their court filings terse, and they readily accuse 
prosecutors of misconduct for engaging in florid or overly revealing 
conversation about a case prior to trial.7 
In the always exceptional sub-field of corporate crime, however, 
the situation is the opposite. It is now routine practice for the DOJ, 
when prosecuting corporations or settling criminal charges with them, 
to speak loudly, often, and at length about what it is doing and why.8 
The standard large corporate settlement includes, at a minimum: a 
lengthy “speaking” indictment or information, or in its stead a 
substantively equivalent “statement of facts,” that details both the 
underlying violations of law and the corporation’s response to those 
violations (or lack thereof); a plea or settlement agreement that 
explains the measures that will be taken by the corporation to redress 
any harm and bolster efforts to prevent future wrongdoing; and a 
press release or press conference at which government officials 
announce the penalties in the case and justify the nature of any legal 
action and settlement.9 
As this process for prosecuting corporations has grown and 
become more routinized over the last two decades, the defense bar 
has had little to say about it other than that prosecutors should be 
 
 5. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006) (discussing the lack of transparency and publicity 
in the prosecutorial system). 
 6. See John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers’ Duty to Balance 
News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L & POL’Y 77, 88 (2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 262 (1993); United States v. Grace, 
401 F. Supp. 2d. 1057, 1058 (D. Mont. 2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Rule 11 Plea Agreement, United States v. Takata Corp., No. 2:16-CR-
20810 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/926051
/download [https://perma.cc/K565-VMW2] (discussing the investigation of defective 
airbags); Letter from Robert L. Capers, U.S. Attorney, E. Dist. of N.Y., & Andrew 
Weissmann, Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark F. Mendelsohn, Esquire (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/911206/download [https://perma.cc/F5Y9-Z9ER] 
(discussing a non-prosecution agreement in an investigation of quid pro quo hiring of 
relatives of Chinese officials and potential clients). 
 9. For an extensive public collection of corporate criminal settlements, see Brandon 
L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry: About, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF 
LAW, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/J6YB-4K8G]. 
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disclosing even more. A common complaint directed at the DOJ is 
that it exercises far too much discretion in this realm and wields its 
power too opaquely and unpredictably. 10  Short of legislation to 
reform the law of corporate criminal liability, firms and their lawyers 
would keenly like the DOJ to be more explicit about how it intends to 
exercise its discretion—who is likely to be charged for what, what 
sorts of settlement agreements and penalties might be on or off the 
table, and what sort of corporate conduct is likely to lead to less or 
more favorable outcomes for firms. 
These calls have been heard at the DOJ. In the last several years, 
federal prosecutors have begun saying more about the corporate 
prosecution process and appear to be more willing than before—and 
far more willing than in any other area of criminal enforcement—to 
tie their own hands (albeit lightly) with policy pronouncements and 
guidance, both in individual enforcement actions and in the more 
general contexts of policy papers and speeches.11 
Prosecutors, to repeat, do not have to do any of this as a matter 
of law or tactics to win their cases. And when enforcement actors 
enjoy power and discretion, they risk giving some of that up, even if 
only at the margins, when they commit themselves to public reasoning 
about their actions. 
This Essay explores various reasons why prosecutors might 
choose to speak about their cases, particularly in the area of 
corporate criminal enforcement, and especially as the DOJ has been 
increasingly doing so in that field over the last two decades. 
Examining the phenomenon might produce a clearer understanding 
of the general question of why prosecutors speak. Perhaps more 
fruitfully, focusing this examination on the sub-field of corporate 
 
 10. Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1507, 1513–14 (2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1137–38 (2016) (calling for various forms of greater oversight 
of and control on the exercise of federal agency enforcement discretion). A more nuanced 
criticism from academic quarters is that the DOJ’s corporate enforcement process too 
often involves counter-productive meddling in corporate governance. See Jennifer Arlen, 
Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose 
Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO 
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 62 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow 
eds., 2011); Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2017); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2078–79 (2016). But 
see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An 
Integrated Approach to Investigations and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2014) 
(“[T]hough substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding into corporate 
governance, this Essay explains the importance of prosecutors investing in it.”). 
 11. See infra Part I. 
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crime might produce new insights into how to evaluate normatively 
what the DOJ is doing in the way it presents its corporate 
enforcement activities—i.e., whether its publicity efforts are helpful 
and, if so, whether and how these efforts could be expanded or 
improved. 
After all, as with so much of the literature in this field, the 
unlikelihood of legislative reform of the practice of American 
corporate criminal liability leaves us necessarily addressing questions 
of how to optimize enforcement under current practice—by directing 
our efforts almost entirely to what prosecutors do.12 There may be 
little to gain, in terms of law reform or novel insight, by publishing 
more laments about that fact. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explains how prosecutors 
speak in the area of corporate crime and how that speech has 
developed over the last two decades. Part II specifies and evaluates a 
variety of explanations for what prosecutors have been saying. Part 
III considers whether recent trends have been favorable and whether 
we should welcome prosecutors continuing along current avenues or 
if we should urge them to rethink how they talk about corporate 
crime. The perhaps counterintuitive conclusion is that observers 
should be skeptical of the value of prosecutors’ written policies, but 
they should also encourage prosecutors to continue to engage in 
detailed public disclosure when settling with individual corporations. 
I.  HOW PROSECUTORS TALK ABOUT CORPORATE CRIME 
A. Birth of DPAs and NPAs 
The modern corporate criminal settlement was famously born in 
1994 when the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York entered into an agreement with Prudential 
Securities, Inc. (“Prudential”) to file a criminal complaint against 
Prudential for securities fraud, defer that prosecution for three years, 
and then dismiss the complaint if Prudential complied with the terms 
of agreement.13 It is now well known that the Prudential deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) was proposed by Prudential’s 
defense counsel, who had the clever idea of avoiding indictment and 
 
 12. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 10, at 47–48; Griffith, supra note 10, at 2116–19, 
2134. 
 13. See Letter Agreement from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., to 
Scott W. Muller & Carey R. Dunne, Attorneys, Davis Polk & Wardell, on behalf of 
Prudential Securities Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).  
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conviction by urging the prosecutors to deploy a procedural device 
long used to divert prosecutions of low-level offenders, most often in 
drug prosecutions.14 The U.S. Attorney’s Office was persuaded to 
take this route in order to avoid a criminal conviction that could cause 
Prudential to collapse. 
The Prudential DPA consisted of a four-page letter that read like 
a modified version of the standard cooperation agreement for 
individual cases that the Southern District of New York was using in 
the early 1990s.15 It required the usual forms of cooperation and 
established the ordinary grounds for breach: provision of corporate 
documents, assistance in gaining access to witnesses, and agreement 
to be held in violation (and thus subject to prosecution) for failure to 
comply with the terms of the deal or commission of any subsequent 
crime.16 In addition, it required Prudential to pay a $330 million 
penalty and install a new, government-approved outside director who 
would act as an “ombudsman” to receive anonymous ethics and 
compliance complaints.17 
Thus, even at the inception of the modern corporate settlement, 
the DOJ was involved in the business of corporate reform in 
conjunction with criminal investigations. However, the Prudential 
DPA contained no statement of facts or other details of Prudential’s 
wrongdoing, much less any admission by Prudential to any matters of 
fact or law.18 Nor did this agreement contain any explanation or 
signals as to why the DOJ chose to exercise its discretion to defer 
prosecution. The letter did include, as an attachment, a letter from 
Prudential’s lawyers appealing to the government’s discretion and 
suggesting the DPA. 19  That letter talked at some length about 
Prudential’s efforts to reform itself in the area of compliance and 
cooperate with various government investigations.20 The Prudential 
DPA was filed with a magistrate judge in the Southern District of 
New York, who signed an order deferring the prosecution for three 
 
 14. See Letter from Scott W. Muller & Carrey R. Dunne, Attorneys, Davis Polk & 
Wardell, on behalf of Prudential Securities, Inc., to Kenneth J. Vianale, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., & Baruch Weiss, Senior Trial Counsel, S. Dist. of N.Y. (Oct. 13, 
1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 15. See Letter Agreement from Mary Jo White, supra note 13. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (letter attachment).  
 20. Id. 
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years.21 The U.S. Attorney, then Mary Jo White, issued a press 
release22 and the New York Times and Wall Street Journal published 
brief stories reporting the resolution.23 Three years later, another 
magistrate judge signed a dismissal order.24 
Another well-known first-generation settlement was the non-
prosecution agreement (“NPA”)25 reached in 1996 between the DOJ 
and the Arthur Andersen accounting firm in connection with an 
investigation of Colonial Realty, a Connecticut company that 
Andersen audited.26 This four-page letter agreement contained no 
statement of facts, no legal allegations, no admission of wrongdoing—
indeed, it noted that Andersen denied any wrongdoing—and no 
reform or oversight obligations. 27  The agreement was simply a 
contract to trade a promise not to prosecute for a promise to 
cooperate, plus $10 million. No explanation was given, or event 
hinted at, with respect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The 
U.S. Attorney in Connecticut issued a brief press release.28 
 
 21. See Deferral of Prosecution, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 1:94-mj-
02189-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994), ECF No. 3. 
 22. Government to Defer Prosecution Over PSI Limited Partnership Sales, 26 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1468, 1468 (Nov. 4, 1994). 
 23. U.S. to Reprimand Rather Than Indict, A Prudential Unit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 
1994, at A8; Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Filing Expected on Prudential, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/27/business/us-filing-expected-on-prudential.html
?pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/N3ND-MLQQ (dark archive)]. Prudential’s lawyer 
called the settlement “unusual” and, when asked whether more such agreements should 
be expected in the future, flatly opined, “No.” Government to Defer Prosecution Over PSI 
Limited Partnership Sales, supra note 22, at 1469. Prognostication is difficult. 
 24. See Order for Dismissal, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 1:94-mj-02189-
UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1997), ECF No. 4. 
 25. A NPA and a DPA differ principally in one way: a DPA provides for the 
government to file charges but not pursue them, and in a NPA, the government agrees to 
refrain from filing charges. See Robert J. Sussman & Gregory S. Saikin, Corporate Crimes: 
The Penalties and the Pendulum, 43 ADVOCATE (TEX), Summer 2008, at 39, 45 n.36. 
 26. See Letter from Edwin J. Gale, Acting U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Conn., Peter A. 
Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Conn., & Thomas J. Murphy, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Dist. of Conn. to Eliot Lauer, Attorney, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 
on behalf of Arthur Andersen LLP, & Shaun S. Sullivan, Attorney, Wiggin & Dana, on 
behalf of Arthur Andersen LLP (Apr. 15, 1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 27. Id. (“It is understood that neither this agreement nor any action taken by 
Andersen under this agreement is an acknowledgement or admission in any way by 
Andersen that it has acted improperly or has violated any law, rule, regulation, 
professional standard, or other standard of practice.”). 
 28. See Steve Burkholder, Arthur Andersen Paying $10.3 Million to End Probe into 
Real Estate Deals, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 568, 569 (Apr. 26, 1996); see also Arthur 
Andersen to Pay $10 Million to Settle Colonial Realty Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1996, at 
C26; George Judson, Accountants to Pay $10 Million to Victims of Real Estate Fraud, N.Y. 
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Andersen’s involvement in this story is perhaps ironic given that 
the firm’s supposed death-by-trial in 2002, in connection with the 
collapse of Enron,29 followed its refusal to accept a DPA that would 
have required an admission of wrongdoing in that affair.30 In the 
intervening years, the DOJ’s views of what a corporate criminal 
resolution ought to accomplish had, as will be discussed, evolved 
substantially. 
B. Current DPA and NPA Practice 
By way of contrast, move forward to current practice. Criminal 
lawyers have long talked about the “speaking indictment,” that is, a 
charging document that sets forth in factual detail the government’s 
case. 31  Prosecutors are not required to plead their cases with 
granularity. The law on the subject requires only that the charging 
instrument provide sufficient notice for the defendant to be able to 
meet the accusations—what offense, committed roughly where, when, 
by whom, and not much more.32 Prosecutors, however, are free within 
reason to draft liberally, as long as they do not gratuitously use the 
charging instrument to prejudice the defendant or uncharged 
persons.33 It seems that in the field of corporate crime, we should now 
add to the idea of the “speaking indictment” the concept of the 
“speaking settlement.” 
Between the early 1990s and the present, the corporate criminal 
settlement has exploded in prevalence. One recent study reports a 
 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/24/nyregion/accountants-to-pay-
10-million-to-victims-of-real-estate-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/62W9-KU53 (dark archive)]. 
 29. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 917 
(2004); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473, 479–87 (2006). 
 30. See Brickey, supra note 29, at 926; Buell, supra note 29, at 489 n.86. 
 31. Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 953, 1003–04 (2010). 
 32. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (noting that “an 
indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly 
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him 
to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense”); 
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that an indictment is 
“not impaired” when it charges more than is necessary for a conviction). But see United 
States v. Olson, 262 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the indictment insufficient 
because it failed to include an essential element of the crime charged). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 384 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961 (W.D. Va. 2005) 
(striking surplusage from an indictment regarding the defendant’s prior issues with 
environmental agencies due to prejudice); United States v. Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252, 292–
93 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (striking “conspired to murder” language from a RICO indictment due 
to the risk of unfair prejudice). 
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total of nearly 500 criminal resolutions of all types between the DOJ 
and public corporations between 1997 and 2011, with a rise in annual 
corporate settlements from ten in 1997 to a high of almost eighty in 
2010.34 There is not space here to conduct an empirical measurement 
of the verbosity of settlement documents over time—this Essay is in 
part a call for how to make such measurement more accessible. But it 
is clear to all in the field that the trend has been away from barebones 
and towards detail, in both disclosure of background facts and in 
contract terms. 
For example, in September 2016, Och-Ziff Capital Management 
(“Och-Ziff”), a hedge fund, entered into a DPA, while one of its 
subsidiaries pled guilty, in connection with violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). 35  The Och-Ziff settlement 
agreements are thick enough for a good-sized binder clip.36 The 
company fully admitted wrongdoing, including conceding all of the 
allegations in a thirty-two-page statement of facts that told the story, 
down to the level of damning emails, of the firm’s bribery activities in 
the resource sector of several African nations.37 The financial penalty 
of $213 million was justified with a detailed analysis of how the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines would have treated the case.38 The company 
was made to promise that it would make no public statements that 
contradicted any aspect of the agreement. 39  Och-Ziff agreed to 
extensive compliance reforms (detailed in a seven-page appendix)40 
and the hiring of a compliance monitor (whose powers and 
obligations were set forth in an even longer appendix).41 
The Och-Ziff agreement even includes a section in which the 
DOJ sets forth in writing “relevant considerations” that led to the 
decision to enter into the agreement.42 The ensuing list includes the 
 
 34. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal 
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea 
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 540 (2015) (studying plea agreements as well as 
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements). 
 35. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits to 
Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept. 
29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-role-
africa-bribery-conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213 [https://perma.cc/4UG5-9C9Q]. 
 36. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. 
Grp. LLC, No. 16-516 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016); Plea Agreement, United States 
v. Oz Africa Mgmt. GP, LLC, No. 16-515 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016). 
 37. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 36, at A-1-32. 
 38. Id. at 7–8. 
 39. Id. at 17–18. 
 40. Id. at C-1 to -7. 
 41. Id. at D-1 to -10. 
 42. Id. at 3–5. 
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amount of discount off of the bottom end of the Sentencing 
Guidelines range that the DOJ granted Och-Ziff as a credit for the 
firm’s decision to self-report, the extent of the company’s efforts to 
assist in the FCPA investigation and to remedy its compliance 
program and internal controls, the agreement to tolerate a monitor, 
the widespread extent of the wrongdoing in “high-risk jurisdictions,” 
and the company’s lack of criminal history.43 
C. The DOJ’s Policies and Guidelines 
Agreements to settle cases are not the only place where 
prosecutors have been talking about corporate criminal settlements. 
As the practice has matured and become more routine, the DOJ has 
issued a series of policy documents and speeches that have 
progressively said more about what the government is doing, when it 
does or does not prosecute corporations, and why. 
The saga of the DOJ corporate prosecution guidelines—the 
journey through the “memos” (that is, guidelines revisions) of Deputy 
Attorneys General Holder, Thompson, McNulty, Filip, and Yates—
has been told often enough in ample detail.44 To condense, the DOJ 
has created and published something for prosecuting corporations, 
which is unique in its manuals and practices, governing the charging 
decisions of its personnel: a lengthy roadmap through a multi-factor 
analysis that the prosecutor must conduct in order to decide on the 
correct resolution of a corporate criminal case, whether it be 
charging, settling, or declining to prosecute.45 
The DOJ has done this, at this level, for no other kind of 
defendant or offense. Of course, the guidelines are not enforceable. 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW 
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (examining “the terms of the 
deals that prosecutors now negotiate with companies, how prosecutors fine companies to 
punish them, the changes companies must make to prevent future crimes, and whether 
prosecutors pursue individual employees”); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, 
Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006) (“Although the rise in the number of agreements may not be 
directly linked to the fall of Enron and Andersen and the rise of the Thompson Memo, the 
temptation to link the three events is overwhelming.”); Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. 
Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice Department’s Corporate 
Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (2014) (examining the impact of recent 
developments in the corporate criminal context on the Justice Department’s historical 
reliance on deferred prosecutions). 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §	9-28.000 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations [https://perma.cc/MEN4-7ZKD]. 
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The law of charging corporations remains the same as it is throughout 
federal and state criminal practice: nearly unreviewable discretion in 
the absence of invidious discrimination.46 Yet the leadership at the 
DOJ in Washington has spent much energy over the last two decades 
pouring over and refining these corporate prosecution guidelines, 
with the periodic splashy release of revisions via press conferences 
and speeches.47 Each iteration of the guidelines has, for the most part, 
expanded them and made them more detailed, as the DOJ adapts to 
how prosecutors learn what works in corporate enforcement. Or what 
is not successful, as in the Filip Memo’s retreat on waivers of attorney 
client privilege 48  or the Yates Memo’s flag-planting about re-
emphasizing individual prosecutions in corporate enforcement.49 
The corporate prosecution guidelines have become a lingua 
franca, or common space, in which prosecutors, the defense bar, 
lobbying groups, the press, and academic critics who write about 
corporate enforcement skirmish over policy and practice. They are 
not law. But in some ways they are strangely law-like. Since 
negotiation, not litigation, is the primary means by which corporate 
criminal cases are resolved, the guidelines become the “rules” in the 
 
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996); Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970); see 
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(noting that the guidelines are “not required by any constitutional or statutory provision” 
and “exist to guide the Department’s exercise of its discretion”). 
 47. See, e.g., Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address 
at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma.cc
/QR43-WWWR]; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Address at American Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st [https://perma.cc
/ZXL4-8KDY]; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at New York University Law School’s Program on Corporate Compliance and 
Enforcement (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-
general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-law [https://perma.cc
/MN43-2FMP]; Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual 
Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-
university-school [https://perma.cc/YF8F-P4W4].  
 48. Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M. Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts a Policy in Corporate 
Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/business
/29kpmg.html [https://perma.cc/BQS4-MK3N (dark archive)]. 
 49. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics
/new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/J84X-2H36 (dark archive)]. 
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shadow of which the government and corporations settle. And their 
authority has accreted over time through repeated use in practice, to 
the point that even some critics who continue to call for more 
meaningful doctrines of corporate criminal liability in American law 
propose a kind of black-letter adoption of the government’s 
prosecution guidelines.50 
From these developments of the last two decades, the DOJ and 
its sister agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
seem to be taking the lesson that even more guideline adoption would 
be better. In November 2012, the DOJ and SEC jointly released “A 
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” a 100-
page document that both explains the government’s views on the 
particulars of the statutory scheme and contains several chapters on 
principles guiding enforcement discretion, how the government 
determines penalties, and what sorts of settlements may be available 
in various contexts.51 
In a related vein, the Fraud Section at the DOJ issued two 
related documents in 2016: a nine-page memo announcing a one-year 
FCPA “pilot program” that explains what companies can do in 
responding to wrongdoing in order to receive up to a fifty percent 
reduction in penalty from the bottom of the applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines range,52 and an eight-page memo that provides additional 
detail on how companies ought to structure and evaluate their 
compliance programs in order to obtain maximum credit from the 
 
 50. W. Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons 
Under the Criminal Law, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 47). 
 51. See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8ZS4-9R2N]. 
 52. FRAUD SECTION, CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE (2016). For 
two examples of commentary on the pilot program, see generally Baker & McKenzie 
Partner Robert Kent on the New World of FCPA Compliance, CORP. CRIME RPTR., Dec. 
12, 2016, at 1, 3–4 (discussing the pilot program in relation to the Harris investigation) and 
Bruce E. Yannett, Andrew M. Levine & Philip Rohlik, The Difficulty of Defining a 
Declination: An Update on DOJ’s Pilot Program, NYU COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Nov. 16, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2016
/11/16/the-difficulty-of-defining-a-declination-an-update-on-the-dojs-pilot-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/MGL4-Y4FU] (discussing the pilot program’s guidance on how to 
receive a declination). For two recent enforcement examples, see General Cable Gets Non 
Prosecution Agreement to Pay $75 Million to Settle FCPA Charge, CORP. CRIME RPTR., 
Jan. 9, 2017, at 7–8 and Rolls Royce to Pay $810 Million to Get Prosecutions Deferred in 
Bribery Case, CORP. CRIME RPTR., Jan. 23, 2017, at 6–7. 
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DOJ in the exercise of enforcement discretion.53Also, back in 2008, 
the DOJ published detailed guidance in a document called the 
Morford Memo on how corporate monitors used in criminal 
settlements should be selected, and how the scope of their duties and 
evaluation of their performance should be determined.54 Corporate 
enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction that 
most commonly works in coordination with the United States, seem 
to believe they too should be making their processes more 
transparent.55 
Through the DOJ’s policies and practices, a common law of 
corporate criminal enforcement has emerged in the twenty-plus years 
since the Prudential settlement. It is contained primarily in the record 
of disclosed, detailed settlements that tell a story about who got what 
for doing what, and secondarily in an unusually verbose set of policy 
pronouncements, about what the DOJ is doing in the field of 
 
 53. FRAUD SECTION, CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/6C87-KR8Q]; see also Jonathan J. Rusch, 
Memorandum to the Compliance Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 6 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 69, 86 (2016) (“For foreign bribery and corruption matters, the 
FCPA Resource Guide has been a substantial step in that direction, but has proved to be 
too brief in presenting its much-touted hallmarks of compliance.”). The Fraud Section had 
made a small splash earlier by announcing that it had hired a private-sector lawyer to work 
as “compliance counsel” who helps advise both the DOJ and corporations about how to 
assess the quality of compliance efforts. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New 
Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download [https://perma.cc/L2TY-
T759]; see also Ryan Rohlfsen & Nicholas F. Rodriguez, DOJ Announces New 
Compliance Counsel and Outlines Metrics for Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs 
Under Scrutiny, ROPES & GRAY (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom
/alerts/2015/November/DOJ-Announces-New-Compliance-Counsel-and-Outlines-
Metrics.aspx [https://perma.cc/B3GJ-AGAN]. 
 54. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of 
Dep’t Components, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (March 7, 2008). For criticism on the lack of 
guidance and coverage of the memorandum, see Ashcroft Defends Role as Federal 
Monitor; DOJ Releases Guidance on Selection Process, 82 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 636 (Mar. 
19, 2008),. For critical analysis of the use of monitors in corporate criminal settlements, see 
Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 
34 J. CORP. L. 679, 681 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The 
Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714–15 (2007). 
 55. See Karolos Seeger & Andrew Lee, UK’s Financial Conduct Authority and 
Prudential Regulation Authority Announce Changes to Enforcement Process, NYU 
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance
_enforcement/2017/02/02/uks-financial-conduct-authority-and-prudential-regulation-authority
-announce-changes-to-enforcement-processes/ [https://perma.cc/58ST-8UT4]. 
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corporate crime and why. There is every reason to expect this process 
of articulation to continue and ramify.56 
None of this is law, although many outside the government wish 
it were.57 There is no requirement of consistency, or proportionality, 
or even rationality in the resolutions that the DOJ reaches with 
individual corporations, and many outside the government think all of 
those things ought to be required.58 Occasionally the DOJ chooses to 
hold its cards quite close in a corporate settlement, and some critics 
think that sort of guardedness disserves the public interest.59 
But, seen from another angle, the DOJ’s approach to corporate 
enforcement stands apart from the brevity with which prosecutors at 
the state and federal levels speak in nearly every other area of 
criminal enforcement. In evaluating the prosecution of corporate 
criminality and thinking about how to reform the practice, it might be 
fruitful to consider prosecutorial behavior in this field from that 
perspective. At the risk of belaboring the point, the law requires none 
of what the DOJ has been doing. Therefore, when it comes to 
corporate crime, why do prosecutors say anything? 
II.  WHY PROSECUTORS TALK THE WAY THEY DO 
Public disclosure by prosecutors can run the gamut from nothing 
more than terse, required court filings—sparsely pleaded indictments 
and bland motion papers—to the extensive, factually detailed 
settlement papers and policy pronouncements that typify the DOJ’s 
approach to corporate crime. To understand what the DOJ has been 
doing in the corporate crime field, it will help to canvass broadly the 
political, economic, strategic, and professional motivations that might 
 
 56. This is subject to the caveat that no one can currently predict whether the Trump 
administration will have interest in continuing the more or less straight-line development 
of corporate crime policy that has characterized the last three presidencies. 
 57. See Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates 
Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 192–93, 
214–17, 226 (2016) (discussing unchecked discretion that runs contrary to the rule of law 
and suggesting more consistency and enforcement, perhaps through enhanced guidelines 
and judicial oversight); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate 
Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 61–62, 72 (2016) (discussing 
ineffectual changes to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and the need for more robust 
enforcement mechanisms for DOJ prosecutors). 
 58. See Arlen, supra note 57, at 231. 
 59. See Brief for Professor Brandon L. Garrett as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellee at 19–23, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (Nos. 
16-308(L), 16-353, 16-1068, 16-1094) (noting that secrecy leads to recidivism and harms 
good compliance); see also GARRETT, supra note 44, at 254 (noting that the public never 
knows if decisions are sound or even which corporate crimes prosecutors investigate in the 
first place). 
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cause prosecutors to disclose information about their cases and talk 
about what they are doing.60 In the field of corporate crime, some 
motivations are more explanatory than others. This Essay moves 
through the following explanations, proceeding roughly from less 
attractive to more appealing: to cause prejudice, for career 
advancement, to obtain public support and promote legitimacy, to 
please Congress, to satisfy industry and the defense bar, to generate 
evidence, and to further the purposes of punishment. 
A. To Prejudice the Jury Pool 
Let’s start with perhaps the most self-interested and unattractive 
motivation for prosecutors to talk about their cases. It has long been a 
complaint of defense lawyers that, in high-profile cases, prosecutors 
hold press conferences to announce criminal charges and include lurid 
facts in their indictments so the press will disseminate the gory details 
to the public.61 The effect is to cement the idea of guilt in the minds of 
the community at large, making it far more likely that persons called 
for jury service in any such case will, consciously or not, harbor fixed 
prejudices against the defendant.62 Starting with arrest, charging, and 
a press conference, the presumption of innocence is replaced by a 
presumption of guilt. While the law on the subject is unfavorable for 
defendants, sometimes such disclosures can give rise to a 
constitutional claim for moving the location of trial or, ex post, for a 
new trial.63 
Disclosure for the purpose of prejudicing the jury pool is, of 
course, improper. But it also cannot be policed as long as the 
prosecutor’s disclosures consist of facts that are spelled out in the 
charging instrument that the prosecutor is required by law to file (that 
is, is based on the evidence), and the prosecutor is careful to liberally 
insert the word “allegation.” Of course, even the cynical prosecutor 
might refrain from this kind of disclosure in a high-profile case, 
calculating that any benefits in solidifying public attitudes are 
 
 60. Disclosures made in the discovery process are not treated as of interest here since 
the question is why prosecutors share information with the public (including, of course, 
subjects of prosecution), and discovery material is typically shared only with charged 
persons and entities. In any event, “discovery” usually runs the other way in corporate 
crime: during the investigative phase (after which almost all cases settle), the documents 
and witness testimony run almost entirely from the corporation to the government. 
 61. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966); United States v. Coast of 
Me. Lobster Co., 538 F.2d 899, 902 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 836 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 63. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377–79 (2010); see also Cutler, 58 
F.3d at 838. 
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outweighed by the strategic advantages lost in tipping one’s hand 
about the proof. 
This perhaps common narrative in the criminal justice system 
does not fit federal prosecution of corporate crime. Given the DOJ’s 
hard-earned reputation for independence and professionalism, one 
would like to think that DOJ lawyers are more responsible and 
careful than the prosecutor who is tempted to inflame public 
sentiment. But predispositions do not matter much because corporate 
cases simply are not pursued with an eye toward trial. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the prosecutor does not hold a press 
conference and release case documents until the defendant has 
already agreed to settle and thus waive any trial rights.64 Potential 
jurors are not a relevant audience. 
B. For Career Advancement 
Drawing a lot of attention in the area of corporate crime could 
be a way for prosecutors to get to future jobs they may want, whether 
those jobs are in higher office or in the private legal sector—or so 
they might think. A sometimes accurate stereotype of prosecutors is 
that they are hungry press hounds who choose their cases and roll 
them out to achieve the maximum possible public exposure for 
themselves: the murder indictment press conference, surrounded by 
the victim’s family; the big drug gang take-down, with the tables 
festooned with kilos of powder and menacing firearms; and, yes, the 
press conference carried live on CNBC to announce the massive fine 
and the admission of wrongdoing secured in the latest criminal 
settlement with a Fortune 500 company. 
This story is at least a bit more nuanced in the case of corporate 
crime. Most federal prosecutors, even most U.S. Attorneys, are not 
aiming for elected office—and they did not need votes to get their 
jobs in the first place. If these prosecutors have an eye on a future job, 
it is almost always one of three positions: a more senior appointment 
with the DOJ, a partnership at a marquee law firm, or a general 
counsel-type position at a major corporation or investment firm. Press 
 
 64. See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death 
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
797, 811 (2013) (noting that more than ninety percent of corporate convictions end in plea 
agreements and that in the year 2010, 139 out of 145 corporate convictions resulted in plea 
agreements); see also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 34, at 563; Brandon L. Garrett, 
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1801–02 n.102 (2011) (pointing 
to U.S. Sentencing Commission data from 2000–2008 showing that 176 corporate 
convictions out of 1,924 (or 9%) occurred at trial). 
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does not hurt, to be sure; name recognition always helps in these job 
markets. But the more direct leverage comes from having built a 
resume that includes “big” prosecutions, whether measured by 
complexity, size of settlement, importance of defendant, or 
seriousness and extent of wrongdoing. 
The resume-building motivation might tilt in favor of playing up 
the features of a corporate prosecution through public disclosure of 
facts and settlement documents. At least equally, it tilts in favor of 
going to trial, a course that the prosecutor largely controls but that 
has been rare in corporate prosecutions, as some observers have 
lamented. 65  The DOJ’s issuance of policy guidance, meanwhile, 
probably does little for individual resumes, unless one thinks that the 
likes of Larry Thompson and Eric Holder needed a memo named 
after them to get where they have gotten. 
Some have worried that career motivations may have caused 
prosecutors to become increasingly attracted to the corporate 
criminal settlement over the last decade or so, at the expense of 
individual prosecutions.66 On this account, prosecutors prefer easy 
cases, especially ones that come with newspaper articles and big 
checks, to hard cases that require long, drawn-out investigations and 
risky, onerous trials.67 The result is that prosecutors grab the low-
hanging fruit of settling charges with the cooperation of compliant 
corporate defendants, then leave the higher, but perhaps better, fruit 
of individual cases unpicked, as they lose interest and move on to the 
tree or orchard of the next alarming industry scandal. 
The Yates Memo would seem to indicate either that the recent 
DOJ leadership shared some of this worry or that prosecutors do not 
like to be criticized for lacking zeal.68 Still, one wonders why the 
ambitiously careerist prosecutor would not seek out trials over 
settlements, especially high-profile trials involving senior corporate 
executives. In any event, it is unlikely that a preference for corporate 
over individual prosecutions, or vice versa, would change anything 
 
 65. For one full lament, see generally JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: 
WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017) (discussing 
how the modern DOJ has lost the will and ability to go to trial in corporate prosecutions).  
 66. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 
1790 (2015); Jed. S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4, 6. 
 67. See EISINGER, supra note 65, at xiv–xv. 
 68. Aruna Viswanatha, Rules to Spur Executive Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2015, 
at A4; Peter J. Henning, The Prospects for Pursuing Corporate Executives, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/business/dealbook/theprospects-for-
pursuing-corporate-executives.html [https://perma.cc/4ZB5-56C8 (dark archive)]. 
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about the prosecutorial taste for attracting public attention. In the 
end, the DOJ’s compunction to talk a great deal more about what it 
does in the field of corporate crime than in other areas is not 
convincingly attributable to the career ambitions of its prosecutors. 
C. For Public Support and Legitimacy 
Even when they are appointed (as in the federal system) rather 
than elected, prosecutors seem to share an abiding and reasonable 
belief that because their “client” is the public, the client has a right to 
know what the prosecutor is doing and should, in some general sense, 
approve of and support the prosecutor’s work. Of course, this only 
goes so far. Few prosecutors take suggestions from the public about 
whom to indict or even what kinds of crime to concentrate on. 
Prosecutors act with a fiduciary-like concept of their relationship to 
the communities in which they work—“your officials know your best 
interests”—while wanting communities to know that they are 
devoting themselves to that task. The primary vehicles for 
communicating this message are the press conference, press release, 
newspaper interview, website, community meeting, and the like. In 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices, these activities comprise a major part of the 
head prosecutor’s job. 
When the interests of the case collide with the interest in 
informing the public, however, the case wins. Prosecutors have no 
compunctions about terse filings, motions to seal pleadings and 
courtrooms, protective orders, the use of clandestine investigative 
measures, and so on—when such secrecy serves the purpose of 
obtaining convictions. Recall the shopworn quote, “We do not 
comment on ongoing investigations,” which at least limits such 
comments to anonymously sourced leaks. 
This legitimation motive is germane to the DOJ’s corporate 
crime program. Perhaps no area of criminal enforcement, aside from 
anti-terrorism efforts, has so preoccupied the American public’s mind 
over the last two decades.69  “What are they doing about those 
corporate criminals?” has been a persistent question since even 
 
 69. See generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016) (discussing issues of American 
public life raised by the subject of corporate crime, how American law defines white collar 
crime, the machinery of criminal enforcement in the business world, and political and 
societal complications raised by these issues); see also Garrett, supra note 64, at 1776 (“In 
the past, domestic prosecutions of foreign corporations were not particularly 
noteworthy.	.	.	. All of this has changed. Federal prosecutors now advertise how they target 
foreign corporations.”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 823 (2018) 
2018] CORPORATE CRIME 841 
before the 2001 collapse of the Enron Corporation and has been an 
even more common one since the 2008 financial crisis.70 It is obvious 
why federal prosecutors, whose jurisdiction has traditionally been 
thought to be primary, if not dominant, over corporate crime, would 
feel defensive about these questions. 
The first way to address such public concerns is to prosecute 
corporate cases. But it is natural that, as the government does this, it 
would want to engage in colorful public displays about what it is 
doing—assembling “task forces,” issuing policy papers, holding press 
conferences to explain how each filed or settled action fits into the 
larger “campaign” against corporate crime, etc. 
There is another specific reason for officials to call as much 
attention as possible to the cases that the government does bring in 
this area. Prosecutors understand, though the public often does not, 
that not everything corporations do that makes the public angry is an 
appropriate or legally eligible candidate for criminal prosecution. It is 
a fact of the current relationship between the corporate sector and the 
regulatory state—about which I have written at some length71—that 
criminal prosecution has come to occupy an ill-fitting role as a 
backstop in dealing with the problem of how to manage and regulate 
the activities of the large, modern firm. Federal prosecutors have 
been partially responsible for this in their zeal to step into various 
regulatory breaches with the tools of federal criminal law.72 But they 
likely also experience anxiety about the limits of those tools in dealing 
with problems that are much larger in their implications than the 
 
 70. See, e.g., Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 1–4 (2010) (statement of Sen. Edward Kaufman); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE 
PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 65–95 (2012); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE 5–7 (2012), http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08
/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7N-MFP9]; Editorial, Going Soft on Corporate 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A26; Joe Nocera, Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of 
Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1, B7; Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS 
television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables 
[https://perma.cc/XVA2-R7G3]; Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING 
STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-
20110216 [https://perma.cc/FP4H-FTQ9]; 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS 
television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/videos/prosecuting-wall-
street-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/4A39-H9EW].  
 71. See generally BUELL, supra note 69 (discussing the history and legal framework of 
prosecuting corporations involved in white collar crime). 
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relatively narrow legal category of crime—limits that the public often 
does not understand and might not care about if it did. 
Thus, when the DOJ, at the press conference accompanying a 
corporate settlement, drops a thick pile of paper and announces the 
collection of a large financial penalty, it is trying hard to say, “Here is 
what we are doing about corporate crime.” The hope, although 
perhaps fanciful, is that the public will eventually come to the 
conclusion that the government is indeed “tough” on corporate 
crime—with the result that prosecutors will be able to sleep better at 
night believing they have done the public’s work. 
D. To Please and Mollify Congress 
Federal prosecutors have a more intimate relationship with their 
legislature than most state prosecutors. Congress, particularly the 
judiciary committees and certain members of those committees, is 
regularly on the DOJ’s back about both prosecutions and policy. The 
DOJ has a tendency to jump when Congress calls because of the 
legislature’s control over budgets and criminal statutes, with both 
mechanisms operating as either a carrot or a stick.73 Congress can 
increase or decrease the DOJ’s resources for investigating and 
prosecuting corporate crime, particularly on the critical dimension of 
staffing. Congress can also expand the law governing business 
crime—as it did, for example, with the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation74—
or it can erect hurdles to such prosecutions—as it threatened to do, 
for example, with regard to the DOJ’s treatment of waivers of the 
corporate attorney-client privilege.75 
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This congressional pressure can cause prosecutors to move in 
two directions that are potentially in tension. On the one hand, 
because members of Congress are even more sensitive than 
prosecutors to public unhappiness about corporate crime, the DOJ 
will want Congress to believe that the DOJ is serious about the 
prosecution of corporate crime. On the other hand, because members 
of Congress are sensitive to the pleas of corporate lobbyists about 
claimed government overreaching, the DOJ will want Congress to 
believe that the DOJ is reasonable and measured in its approach to 
investigating and prosecuting corporate crime. The latter motivation 
produces a common dynamic in federal criminal law: the DOJ tends 
to hold back, at least with some regularity, from pressing the outer 
limits of its statutory powers, lest it provoke Congress into curtailing 
those powers by legislation.76 
Thus, when the DOJ makes a noisy announcement about a high-
profile corporate enforcement action, it is in part gesturing down 
Pennsylvania Avenue in the direction of Congress to show that its 
prosecutors have been busy. The case then gets added to the running 
list of corporate prosecutions that the DOJ will roll out for 
congressional committees when members of Congress come 
demanding to know what the Department has been doing.77 It should 
be noted, of course, that this dynamic has far more influence on 
officials at Main Justice in Washington, who work in the shadow of 
Capitol Hill and know that the unpleasant task of congressional 
testimony can be demanded of them at any moment. U.S. Attorneys 
need concern themselves less with the direct meddling of Congress,78 
though they face constant pressure from Main Justice to produce the 
data that the DOJ’s leadership uses to justify its budgets and to keep 
Congress at bay.79 
At the same time, the DOJ is sometimes quick to modify its 
practices when it sees a restless Congress preparing to interfere with 
prosecutorial powers. There is no evidence, of which I am aware, that 
the original corporate prosecution guidelines (the Holder Memo) 
were issued in response to any congressional complaints. The likely 
strongest motivation was to standardize prosecutorial practices in the 
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growing field of corporate criminal enforcement that had produced 
concerning inconsistency and unpredictability.80 
But in the absence of the DOJ’s continual and deep attention, 
from the top of the Department, to how its prosecutors exercise 
charging discretion in this one area, it would have been far easier for 
the DOJ’s critics to make the case that the federal doctrine of 
corporate criminal liability ought to be narrowed by statute. The use 
of written charging guidelines and centralization of authority at Main 
Justice has been one way that the DOJ has kept Congress’s hands off 
of some of federal prosecutors’ favorite tools, including the RICO 
and money laundering statutes and the FCPA.81 
In two notable instances in the area of corporate crime, the DOJ 
has staved off legislation by issuing written guidance changing policy. 
When Congress—largely in response to overbearing prosecutorial 
behavior in the KPMG tax shelter affair82 and the reaction of federal 
courts in New York to that behavior83—became interested in passing 
legislation restricting prosecutors’ abilities to obtain waivers of 
attorney-client privilege, the DOJ changed its policy to prohibit most 
waiver requests. 84  Congress duly lost interest in the legislation. 
Similarly, when Congress—largely in response to two kerfuffles 
involving then U.S. Attorney Chris Christie and former Attorney 
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General John Ashcroft85—began to pursue legislation governing the 
appointment of monitors in corporate criminal settlements, the DOJ 
issued guidelines to control the selection and supervision of 
monitors.86 Congress again lost interest in legislating. 
Corporate crime is politically high profile, affects powerful actors 
in the economy, and is subject to exceptionally broad prosecutorial 
powers. Naturally, Congress would tend to be interested in meddling 
in this area of criminal enforcement more than in some others, and 
the DOJ would be particularly keen to protect its potent position in 
the field. A logical question is why the DOJ’s public performances 
around corporate prosecutions would have any effect on Congress. 
Likely the standard political economy explanation holds here, 
with a bit of emphasis: Congress generally prefers not to restrict 
prosecutorial powers through legislation, and indeed often expands 
those powers, so it can benefit from the perception that it has zero 
tolerance for crime; Congress counts on federal prosecutors to 
exercise their powers judiciously, lest the breathtaking scope of those 
powers embarrass the entire government; and prosecutors oblige in 
order to preserve their unfettered power.87 In corporate crime, this 
dynamic is only more likely to operate because of the desire among 
most members of Congress to walk a fine line between being anti-
business crime but pro-legitimate business activities. 
E. To Satisfy Industry and the Defense Bar 
Federal prosecutors have a reason to talk about what they are 
doing in the area of corporate crime that has no analogue in the 
enforcement of “regular” criminal law. Prosecutors, it turns out, are 
susceptible to a kind of lobbying. This pressure, which influences their 
tendency to make written policies and disclose them, is related to the 
pressure that industry can indirectly place on prosecutors through its 
influence on Congress. But it goes beyond that. It comes from the 
influence of industry lawyers on government lawyers. The dynamic 
has to do with the increasingly infamous and lucrative “revolving 
door” in corporate crime law practice, but the point is subtler than the 
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claim that prosecutors seek to please the corporate defense bar so 
that it will hire them.88 
Speculation is required here because the point is likely 
impossible to observe empirically. There is a shared view within the 
corporate crime bar—prosecutors and defense lawyers alike who, of 
course, do switch sides and work together with regularity—that the 
practice of corporate criminal enforcement requires a transparency 
and predictability that is not demanded in other areas of criminal 
prosecution. I do not think this belief is primarily motivated by a 
tendency to collude in order to keep each other fully employed. It 
likely has something to do with a shared sense that the bar in this area 
is involved in a kind of economic regulation—a practice that has 
wider policy implications—that does not apply in other areas of 
criminal enforcement. Perhaps this shared culture stems from a belief 
that the subjects of criminal enforcement in this area, especially the 
corporations themselves, are for the most part law-abiding legal 
persons engaged in legitimate activities and therefore, must be 
treated with a level of care and given a degree of notice and clarity 
that are not demanded elsewhere in criminal law. 
Of course, many would say that this notion is a pathology: 
corporations should be treated like ordinary criminals, and 
disadvantaged offenders should get all the informal process that 
corporations receive.89 But that is a normative point. Descriptively, 
what we might call the “culture of the conference room” in the 
practice of corporate crime is both more complicated in its origins 
than some think and more powerful in how it influences the 
willingness of prosecutors, indeed their sense of obligation, to explain 
what they are doing. 
It would be easy to miss this final point because it seems that 
federal prosecutors and the corporate defense bar constantly disagree 
about both law and policy when it comes to corporate crime. But this 
is skirmishing at most, just something to talk about at the least. 
Indeed, the continual conversation—not just in conference rooms but 
in the newspapers and bar journals, at endless conferences on the 
subject, in congressional testimony, and in law reviews—is evidence 
that the bar as a whole agrees that this is an appropriate area for 
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policymaking dialogue. Imagine the shock if an assistant attorney 
general were to walk into the next conference on corporate crime and 
say, “Game over, folks, and we are taking the ball with us. From now 
on, you will get as much information about what we are doing as the 
John Gottis and Pablo Escobars of the world.” Federal prosecutors 
have fully internalized the (albeit controversial) idea that corporate 
prosecution is a form of industry regulation. 
F. To Produce More Evidence 
In individual prosecutions that are parts of larger investigations, 
a prosecutor’s use of a “speaking indictment,” as well as other types 
of detailed court filings, often has a strategic purpose. By describing 
allegations in terms of what the prosecutor’s evidence, including 
witnesses and documents, shows, the prosecutor hopes to encourage 
the charged defendant, as well as others charged and uncharged, that 
litigation is likely to fail and that cooperating with the government is 
the wisest course. In other words, the prosecutor discloses 
information about the prosecutor’s case in the hopes of strengthening 
the case. In the prosecutor’s best scenario, a series of such disclosures 
as charges are rung up in an ongoing campaign against, for example, 
the mafia or a drug cartel creates a cascade effect in which newly 
arrested or even confronted subjects quickly “flip,” believing 
resistance to be futile. 
There might be some of this motivation in disclosing information 
about corporate prosecutions, but not likely as much. In an 
investigation involving multiple firms in a single industry, a 
prosecutor might think that disclosure of a strong case against one 
corporation could make others more pliable. For example, this could 
have been driving some of the fanfare around initial settlements in 
the LIBOR and FX currency trading scandals, and perhaps also in the 
government’s civil settlements with the large banks for mortgage-
backed securities trading under the FIRREA statute.90 A prosecutor 
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might think that disclosure of details in a corporate settlement could 
motivate defendants and witnesses to offer testimony as the 
government pursues individual prosecutions in the wake of the 
settlement. My own impression is that these strategic motivations 
tend to be swamped by the prosecutor’s stronger desire to send the 
usual broader policy messages about deterring corporate crime. 
G. To Serve the Purposes of Punishment 
Federal prosecutors undoubtedly would say that the analysis to 
this point over-complicates things: they talk a lot about corporate 
crime because that is how one achieves the policy objectives of 
criminal law in this field. The DOJ’s written policies on corporate 
prosecutions are explicit in announcing the government’s objectives: 
to promote “good corporate citizenship”; to obtain deterrence on a 
wide scale; to reform criminogenic institutions; to help make victims 
whole; and the like.91 The best-known part of those policies—the ten 
factors that are meant to guide the decision whether to charge a 
corporation—are in large part an effort to fit ordinary thinking about 
criminal punishment to the odd case of the business institution.92 
Prosecutors must weigh the seriousness and extent of the wrongdoing, 
the corporation’s tendency toward recidivism, and the corporation’s 
contrition (in the form of cooperation, remedial effort, and reform).93 
When it comes to both charging and sentencing, prosecutors are 
meant to think about these sorts of things in any criminal case. 
It is clearly the view of the DOJ, as well as many who think 
about white collar crime, that the business sector is fertile ground for 
the criminal law to send messages. On this account, white collar 
criminals pay more attention than “street” offenders to what the law 
and the government are doing, and they use that information more 
self-consciously to plan their activities.94 “This is great,” thinks the 
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jaundiced prosecutor who sees first-hand the parade of recidivists 
through the system in drug, gun, and organized crime cases. “Here is 
an area where the basic theories of punishment might actually work!” 
Starting with the most defendant-centric theories, the DOJ 
believes its corporate prosecution program, perhaps above all, is 
designed to send a strong message—even a message that 
stigmatizes—to the corporate defendant itself. The purposes of this 
message are to punish the defendant, including through negative 
publicity, to deter the corporate defendant from committing (or 
perhaps better, allowing) future violations of law, and to rehabilitate 
the defendant so that it promotes legal compliance in the future.95 
It has long been a DOJ practice in the settlement of a corporate 
prosecution, whether or not it involves a guilty plea, to require at 
least a defendant’s factual, if not also legal, admission to 
wrongdoing.96 That admission, together with a detailed statement of 
facts and an announcement of financial and other penalties, is 
broadcast in publicly available documents that are disseminated 
widely, at least in cases involving large corporations. 
One might think that publicity is not necessary when a 
prosecution seeks to impose retribution and obtain specific 
deterrence because the defendant is already paying attention. But 
even within the confines of a large corporation, public and 
widespread disclosure of the nature of the wrongdoing, the penalties, 
and the rehabilitative measures imposed can garner the attention of 
the many stakeholders in the corporation who may be spread around 
the world. And the publicity itself is part of the punishment: it may 
impose a reputational consequence on the firm, and even to some 
extent on its managers, that has the potential to discourage future 
episodes of wrongdoing.97 Requiring a firm to admit wrongdoing in a 
highly publicized setting may contribute to the seriousness with which 
stakeholders view the problem, promoting introspection and reform.98 
 
 95. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (2009). 
 96. For a comprehensive collection of such settlements over time, see Garrett & 
Ashley, supra note 9. 
 97. See Buell, supra note 29, at 491–525; see also Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature 
of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 491 
(1999); Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2007); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, 
The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 194 
(2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of 
Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008).  
 98. See Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 513 (2014); Verity Winship & Jennifer K. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 823 (2018) 
850 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
Thus, disclosure of the prosecutor’s case and of the justifications for 
her actions may have a role to play in corporate crime that is missing, 
or at least less present, in “ordinary” criminal cases. 
The DOJ’s primary and openly professed ambition in 
prosecuting corporate crime is to reduce the incidence of corporate 
crime, principally by encouraging corporate managers to take steps to 
prevent or reduce wrongdoing by employees. 99  Regular and 
widespread disclosure of both the details of enforcement actions and 
of policy guidance can be viewed as central, even essential, to the 
pursuit of this objective. The DOJ’s persistent public emphasis on the 
benefits to corporations, in both charging discretion and penalties, 
from cooperation, self-reporting, and vigorous compliance 
programs—an emphasis which has been sharpened by recent policies 
in FCPA enforcement—is designed to send a strong message. That 
message is that corporations should police their employees, both to 
prevent crime in the first instance and to ensure that wrongdoers are 
punished in the second instance, and it will be expensive to fail to do 
so.100 
The DOJ has wholeheartedly adopted the deterrence theory of 
corporate criminal liability advocated by utilitarian theorists who 
defend the idea of using criminal processes against corporations.101 
The Department’s commitment to this theory has only grown 
stronger over time, as it has increased both the extent of its policy 
pronouncements on the subject102 and, more substantially, the extent 
to which its settlement documents speak at length about the 
defendant corporation’s efforts, or lack thereof, at compliance, 
cooperation, and reform.103 In the area of corporate prosecutions, 
federal prosecutors are engaged in a campaign to, in effect, regulate 
corporate legal compliance—at least as it relates to compliance with 
federal criminal law.104 Obviously, the success of such an effort would 
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depend, at least in large part, on the government’s ability to 
disseminate its messages throughout particular industries and the 
corporate sector as a whole.105 
III.  WHAT SHOULD WE WANT PROSECUTORS TO SAY? 
In discussions about the American criminal justice system, which 
is now dominated and pervaded by prosecutorial discretion, a 
common call is for “accountability” of prosecutors.106 This demand 
needs much specification. In the most general sense, I take it to mean 
that prosecutors ought to be required to exercise their discretion in 
the public interest and that there ought to be mechanisms for holding 
them to that obligation. This, however, leaves a lot to be explained in 
terms of what the public interest is and how prosecutors might be 
held to it. 
With respect to corporate crime, it seems reasonable to think 
that federal prosecutors would understand their duty to include 
reducing the incidence of criminal violations by employees of large 
corporations, when cost effective. While deterrence of crime is a 
notoriously difficult subject for empirical proof,107 the government’s 
basic theory of corporate crime over the last two decades—using the 
threat of criminal prosecution to leverage the power of corporations 
over their employees to prevent and detect individual crimes—is 
plausible. Whether the DOJ’s contemporary approach is the optimal 
program for dealing with corporate crime is, of course, hotly debated, 
and it is not the purpose of this Essay to take up that controversy.108 
Assume that enforcement realities guarantee that the 
government will continue to depend on its power over corporations as 
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one of its principal means of deterring and detecting business crime.109 
Determining whether prosecutors make decisions and take actions in 
this area in furtherance of a good faith and reasonably effective effort 
along these lines depends on having information about what they are 
doing and, to at least some extent, what they are thinking. 
Accountability depends on transparency, sunlight disinfects, and so 
on. Particularly because the topic of how corporate crime ought to be 
treated in the criminal justice system is so controversial—including on 
the very question of what is a crime in the first place—this field 
demands regular public justification for prosecutorial decisions. 
Transparency, however, is not an unalterable good. In criminal 
enforcement, secrecy is often necessary to the acquisition of evidence 
because individuals engaged in wrongdoing work to conceal their 
activities. Evidence, it goes without saying, is the essence of a 
successful prosecution. In addition, in an adversarial system—and 
prosecutors of corporate crime face the best adversaries in criminal 
practice—over-sharing of information and strategy can lead to defeat 
at the hands of skilled counsel, including in cases that, on their merits, 
ought to have resulted in punishment. Badly motivated corporate 
managers might also use the government’s disclosures about how it 
makes its corporate cases, and how it exercises its charging and 
sanctioning discretion, as a roadmap for unlawful activities designed 
to evade legal sanction. 
Not surprisingly, then, the conclusion here is that prosecutors 
talking publicly about corporate criminal enforcement has some good 
reasons and desirable effects but also some unattractive motivations 
and potential downsides. Disclosure designed to deter corporate 
crime should be welcomed when its benefits exceed its drawbacks in 
hampering effective enforcement. Disclosure meant to further the 
professional ambitions of prosecutors, however, has no value. Nor is it 
clear that the public has any real interest in disclosure that is designed 
only to foster legitimacy—the idea that prosecutors are doing their 
job—whether that idea is encouraged among the public generally or 
more specifically with observers in Congress. 
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Whether the public realizes it or not, the public’s agenda is 
corporate criminal enforcement, not the politics of corporate crime. 
Consider a recent example, one that happens to have mostly involved 
the prosecution of individuals, not firms. The U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York determined the prosecutions 
stemming from the 2008 financial crisis constituted “the biggest 
insider trading bust since the infamous Ivan Boesky case back in the 
1980s,” which “at the time [was] the largest crackdown ever on white 
collar crime.”110 This wave of prosecutions attracted a great deal of 
press, most of which was encouraged by the U.S. Attorney.111 No 
doubt one objective of publicity in this context was to create the 
impression that miscreant traders in the hedge fund industry will get 
caught and punished, and thus deter insider trading.112 One cannot 
measure deterrent effect in this context because the incidence of 
insider trading is not observable. But it is more than reasonable to 
think that eighty prosecutions involving wiretaps, informants, and 
cooperating witnesses, where previously there had been only sporadic 
criminal enforcement, had some chilling effect on the relevant 
criminal activity. 
At the same time, even if he doubted the deterrent value in 
doing so, then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
Preet Bharara surely would have been eager to publicize his anti-
insider trading campaign. Indeed, at one point in the campaign he 
declared insider trading to be “rampant” on Wall Street,113 a message 
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that might perversely have encouraged the belief that most violators 
still were not being caught and thus the risk of prosecution remained 
low. He also must have thought that publicizing his efforts, at a time 
when the anti-Wall Street sentiment was at one of its all-time highs, 
would cause the public to believe there was an active sheriff on the 
financial crime beat. This would perhaps calm the outrage a bit and, 
in terms of the strange theology of market regulation, perhaps 
“restore public faith in the markets” so that the capital would keep on 
flowing.114 It might also, of course, identify him personally as the guy 
cracking down on business crime.115 
Moving to specific forms of disclosure that have been discussed 
in this Essay, I suggest that the conclusion might be the opposite of 
what was expected. Objective analysis might be expected to wind up 
favoring the careful and regular policy pronouncement over the 
splashy revelation of the details of one corporate crime or another. 
Again, it is the policy material—the DOJ’s pre-commitment in 
writing on matters of discretion—that the defense bar and many 
academic commentators have persistently clamored for, and which 
the government has periodically provided in part to satisfy those 
constituencies.116 
But there is reason to be skeptical of whether policy memos, 
guidelines, and the like are the best evidence of what prosecutors do, 
and will do in the future, and of their reasoning and motivations. 
There are many audiences for such policy pronouncements, the last 
among which might be the people who actually contemplate whether 
to commit corporate crime. Indeed, some observers have sharply 
questioned whether the obsessive focus in these documents on 
compliance programs, as well as the similar focus in the corporate 
sentencing guidelines, promotes a wasteful compliance industry that 
expensively elevates form over substance in the management of large 
firms.117 Not only does this serve the interests of prosecutors in 
legitimizing what they are doing by making it seem more law-like and 
more driven by policy objectives, but also it serves the interests of the 
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private bar and related professionals who sell their services to 
corporations on the claim that their expertise can help companies 
avoid trouble with the DOJ. 
An example to be especially skeptical about is the recent Yates 
Memo. The DOJ revised its corporate prosecution guidelines to insert 
lots of additional language about the importance of prosecuting 
individuals in corporate cases and not substituting a corporate 
settlement for charging individual violators.118 The guidelines had 
never said anything about not charging individuals, and the DOJ had 
never described itself as uninterested in that objective. But legal and 
media commentators, as well as some members of Congress, had been 
complaining in the wake of the financial crisis that the Department 
had lost its appetite for individual white-collar prosecutions. 119 
Prosecutors, especially federal prosecutors, cannot stand to be called 
lazy. And it may have been true that senior officials in the DOJ were 
aware of individual examples in which line prosecutors had walked 
away from corporate settlements without showing enough zeal about 
following up on individual prosecutions—or, even worse, implicitly 
traded a corporate settlement for a decision to stand down on 
individuals. 
So the DOJ issued a policy memo, with an extensive media 
rollout, that changes virtually nothing about the realities of corporate 
crime prosecution. The Yates Memo keeps saying to try harder to 
pursue individual prosecutions.120 But it does not address the most 
common reason that individual prosecutions fail or never get off the 
ground in the first place: the criminal laws of the United States and 
the nature of the large corporate institution combine to make it 
extremely difficult in all but the most flagrant cases of corporate 
crime to succeed in assigning liability to individual corporate 
managers.121 The DOJ knows this better than anyone, especially in 
the wake of the mortgage-backed securities trading fiasco. 
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The DOJ also well knows (because it invented the practice) that 
the credible threat to impose criminal liability on corporations, not 
individuals, is the principal means by which the DOJ obtains evidence 
of crimes within large corporations.122 Indeed, to the extent that the 
Yates Memo has any hard edges, they are about corporate, not 
individual, liability: the memo instructs prosecutors that they may not 
give a corporation credit for cooperation unless and until the 
company has done everything it can to give the DOJ provable cases 
against employees. 123  Thus the Yates Memo can be read as a 
somewhat cynical, or at least cute, response to the years of criticism of 
the DOJ for supposed weakness on prosecuting executives, especially 
in the financial sector. Even though the memo could do nothing about 
law or problems of proof, it seems to have spurred a mild panic in 
some private quarters that the government is really coming to take 
lots of management scalps.124 
When it comes to federal prosecutors, we should watch what 
they do, not what they say. The growing phenomenon of the 
“speaking settlement” is to be warmly welcomed and further 
encouraged. Give us lots of detail about the nature of the underlying 
wrongdoing and the strength of the case: who was involved, what was 
done, where it occurred, how long it lasted, and so on. Be specific. 
And always get an admission so the facts become a lasting and 
indisputable record of the case. Put numbers on things whenever 
possible. Tell the public what the sanctions are going to be and how 
they were calculated. Describe in detail the extent to which the crimes 
were or were not attributable to corporate culture, compliance 
programs, management directives, and the like—explain how it was a 
case of corporate crime, not just respondeat superior liability. 
Quantitatively or qualitatively, score the quality of a company’s 
efforts at remediation and cooperation relative to other cases. Tell the 
public how prosecutors reasoned their way to this particular 
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settlement.125 And when possible—perhaps this is asking too much—
get the company to agree to disclose its own investigative report on 
the wrongdoing.126 
What we get through this disclosure mechanism is not the bland 
language of unenforceable policy pronouncements but a kind of 
common law of corporate enforcement—a body of case law, if you 
like, that we can read and study. We get empirical data, the lack of 
which has been the biggest barrier to rigorous study of the most 
important phenomenon in the present American criminal justice 
system: how and why prosecutors wield their power.127 If lawyers and 
academics can begin to tell crisper-edged stories about what the DOJ 
has been doing from case to case in the enforcement of criminal law 
against corporations, clearer messages might emerge about how to 
comply with the law, and greater transparency will exist about 
whether the DOJ’s actions are serving the public interest.128 If the 
DOJ is going to continue to issue policy statements about corporate 
crime, those statements should tell federal prosecutors what they 
must file or disclose when they settle a case and specifically what 
those documents must say about both the wrongdoing and the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in response to that wrongdoing. 
CONCLUSION 
The enormous and mostly unreviewable power that federal 
prosecutors exercise in a process dominated by settlements warrants 
ample skepticism about the motivations underlying what they choose 
to disclose and say. But it remains remarkable, and in need of 
explanation, that there is so much more disclosure and speaking in 
the field of corporate crime than in any other area of federal 
prosecution. Professional self-interest and Washington politics may 
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explain some of this behavior, but the effort to accomplish something 
programmatically likely explains more of it. 
This behavior has the potential to benefit the public. It is to be 
encouraged and, if possible, channeled. In particular, case-specific 
information over a large number of cases has greater value than 
policy boilerplate. A prosecutor’s description of facts that a firm 
agrees to as a condition of settlement cannot fully substitute for what 
might be learned through full-blown litigation and trial. But 
settlement will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future, and 
those of us who wish to study and debate the practice of corporate 
criminal enforcement should encourage more of what we can get. 
